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25 November 1955

DATE: 4 Nov 77
By: 021
21 MAR 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

FROM: Assistant Director for Basic Intelligence

SUBJECT: Manpower Utilization

1. The following information is submitted in response to your memorandum of 18 November 1955, subject as above.

2. The major functions of OBI are those required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to the NIS program as set forth in NSCID No. 3, 13 January 1948. They are: 1) over-all coordination of the NIS program, and 2) the review, editing, publication, and dissemination of the National Intelligence Surveys. All functions are equal in terms of priority as all are essential to the timely processing of the NIS contributions submitted by the more than 40 producing components of the agencies participating in the program. As of 31 October 1955, the OBI staff performing these functions was as follows:

	<u>Professional</u>	<u>Admin.</u>	<u>Clerical</u>
Over-all coordination of the NIS Program and administration of OBI			
Editorial review and editing, including working level coordination			
Publication processing of NIS text and graphic material for printing			

Totals

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3. Should a 10% cut in personnel be necessary it would not be possible to eliminate any single function of OBI since this would stop all output of NIS. Such a reduction, which would involve seven positions, would have to be applied across the board to all functions in order to maintain a balance in the processing operation. Reducing capabilities to this extent would result in unacceptable delay in providing the government agencies with finished NIS for which they have an urgent need. This is of particular concern to some agencies which have discontinued departmental programs with the expectation that the finished NIS, which incorporates the intelligence that was formerly presented in departmental publications, would be made available with reasonable promptness. An alternate course would be to lower the review, editing and publication standards to a point permitting the continuation of the present processing rate with the reduced staff. Such a course is considered most undesirable from the standpoint of its effect on the morale of the OBI staff which maintains very high standards in their processing of NIS material, and also its adverse effect on the NIS program as a whole if the quality of the NIS is sacrificed.

4. The workload in OBI is imposed by the IAC and non-IAC agencies participating in the NIS program. Production by these agencies during the past four years has been at approximately the rate established for the program by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and schedules for FY-1956 and FY-1957 provide for continued production at this level. Unless capabilities of OBI are realistically in line with the actual workload imposed by the contributors, CIA's responsibility in this interdepartmental National Intelligence program cannot be fulfilled. The presently authorized positions for OBI were established on the basis of actual requirements, and if a 10% cut in personnel is imposed the workload would also have to be reduced if CIA is to meet its responsibilities in this program. This would require a reduction in the rate of production established for the program by the JCS; revision of the NIS production schedules, and re-alignment of production staffs in the contributing agencies. However, any such reduction in production of NIS would be contrary to the long established policy of this Agency, and would also be in direct opposition to the views of many high level government components which have urged accelerated production of NIS to meet pressing requirements for basic intelligence.

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5. There is no duplication of the functions of OBI either within or without CIA. The magnitude and complexity of the NIS program are such that the functions of OBI are essential to the success of the program, and are of a nature which precludes performance by any agency other than the one which has responsibility for the over-all implementation of the program. This responsibility, and the functions assigned to OBI, are charged specifically to the Director of Central Intelligence in the above cited NSC Directive. Under the circumstances transfer of the OBI functions to any other agency would be wholly infeasible.

6. The authorized positions plus 3 IAC slots provided for in the approved T/O for OBI were considered adequate for processing NIS on a current basis at the FY-1955 level of operations. However, the level of NIS activity is increasing substantially in the current fiscal year as a result of progressive expansion of the NIS to provide intelligence required for Psychological Warfare and United States Information Agency programs; increase in Chapter I production; greater emphasis on maintenance revisions of published NIS; further development of the new NIS "Key Personalities" unit, and participation in the new International Communism program. The full impact of these developments on OBI activity is expected in FY-1957. To cope with the increased workload authorization was given by your office to establish five additional positions in OBI, and to recruit personnel to fill these positions, with formal action to include these additional positions in the T/O to follow (DD/I Memorandum for the Record, 5 October 1955, Subject: Additional Slots for OBI). This will increase the T/O for OBI to positions, and 3 IAC slots, and this augmentation of the OBI staff is essential to the fulfillment of this Agency's responsibilities under the expanded program. 25X9A2

7. With respect to OBI functions, utilization of contractual procedures and external projects is not feasible.

8. The OBI operation is but one facet of a government-wide inter-departmental program, and any curtailment of capabilities of this office will have an adverse effect on all other participating agencies. Undoubtedly other components in the Agency are in a similar position, and any across-the-board reduction in personnel would, therefore, appear to be inappropriate. If personnel cuts are necessary, it is suggested that consideration be given to effecting the required reduction by eliminating, or discontinuing until such time as the personnel situation permits reactivation, some of the activities

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whose functions do not involve the entire Intelligence Community. This would permit not only maintenance of adequate staffs in the interdepartmental activities which are fundamental to the mission of the Agency, but might also provide a means for some augmentation of these staffs by transfer of personnel from de-activated units.



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